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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LOGAN CITY, * 
Plaintiff-Respondent, * Case No. 900115-CA 
vs. * Case Type: APPEAL 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, * Priority Number 2 
Defendant-Appellant. * 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
This- appeal was taken by the Appellant to the Utah Court of 
Appeals from the First Circuit Court of the State of Utah, County 
of Cache, Logan City Department pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A. Section 77-35-26. 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Does Appellant have standing to challenge L.M.C. Section 
10.56.010. 
2. Was Appellant placed twice in jeopardy for the same 
offense of no Utah registration. 
3. Is Utah's Motor Vehicle Act unconstitutionally vague. 
4. Does the Utah Motor Vehicle Seat Belt Usage Act violate 
equal protection of the laws. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOGAN MUNICIPAL CODE SECTION 10.56.010. 
II. APPELLANT WAS NOT PLACED TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME 
OFFENSE OF NO UTAH REGISTRATION. 
III. UTAH'S MOTOR VEHICLE ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL. THE TERM 
"RESIDENT" FOR PURPOSES OF THE ACT IS NOT VAGUE BUT RATHER CLEARLY 
DEFINED UNDER UTAH LAW. 
IV. UTAH'S MOTOR VEHICLE SEAT BELT USAGE ACT DOES NOT DENY 
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. 
A. THE SEAT BELT ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE. 
B. APPELLANT DOES NOT RAISE A VALID CLAIM OF 




APPELLANT DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOGAN MUNICIPAL CODE SECTION 
10.56.010. 
Appellant contends that Logan Municipal Code (L.M.C.) Section 
10.56.010 is unconstitutional. This argument has been improperly 
brought by Appellant because Appellant lacks standing to challenge 
the constitutionality of this particular Section. Appellant was, 
by amended information, charged and convicted in the court below 
for violating L.M.C. Section 10.04.010 which incorporates U.C.A. 
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Section 41-1-18. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713 
(1978): 
A party to whom a statute is inapplicable cannot question 
its constitutionality by seeking a declaration of rights. 
The general rule is applicable that a party having only 
such interest as the public generally cannot maintain an 
action. In order to pass upon the validity of a statute, 
the proceeding must be initiated by one whose special 
interest is affected, and it must be a civil or property 
right that is so affected. 
The Utah Court further indicated what Appellant must plead to 
have a valid claim. "Appellant may seek and obtain a declaration 
as to whether a statute is constitutional by averring in his 
pleading the grounds upon which he will be directly damaged in his 
person or property by its enforcement." (emphasis added.) 
Appellant must allege facts indicating how he will be damaged by 
actual or likely enforcement at the statute. Baird 574 P. 2d at 
716. See also Klein v. Roustadt, 716 P.2d 1060 (Ariz. App. 1986) 
and 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Deva, 669 P.2d 1183 (Or. App. 1983). 
Appellant has not been injured by enforcement of L.M.C. 
Section 10.56.010 and has not shown any threat of enforcement of 
the statute against him. Under no condition will a determination 
of the constitutionality of L.M.C. Section 10.56.010 have an impact 
on the decision of the trial court below. 
This court cannot properly address, and Respondent is not 
required to defend the constitutionality of L.M.C. Section 




THE APPELLANT WAS NOT PLACED TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE 
SAME OFFENSE OF NO UTAH REGISTRATION. 
Appellant claims that because the City Prosecutor amended its 
information during trial, the City placed Appellant twice in 
jeopardy for the same offense. What Appellant claims to be double 
jeopardy is actually acceptable criminal procedure in Utah 
supported by statute and a wealth of case law. 
A brief recital of the circumstances surrounding Appellant's 
charge and conviction below will be helpful. Appellant was 
originally charged by information for violating L.M.C. Section 
10.56.010. During trial, prosecution amended the information 
charging Appellant with violating L.M.C. Section 10.04.010 rather 
than Section 10.56.010. L.M.C. Section 10.04.010 incorporates 
U.C.A. Section 41-1-18, which like Section 10.56.010, requires 
vehicles to be registered according to the laws of Utah. 
Subsequently, Appellant was convicted of violating Section 
10.04.010. 
Prosecution's amendment of the information in this case, with 
court's permission, is acceptable criminal procedure in Utah. 
U.C.A. Section 77-35-4(d) provides that a "court may permit an 
indictment or information to be amended at any time before verdict 
if no additional or different offense is charged and substantial 
rights of the Defendant are not prejudiced." The City Prosecutor's 
amendment was clearly within the purview of this section. The City 
Prosecutor did not alter the substantive charge nor prejudice 
Appellant's substantial rights. The Utah Court of Appeals stated 
5 
in State v. Pierce, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 38 (1989), that "Utah 
law allows amendment of an information before a verdict is issued 
if no new or different offense is charged and the Defendant is not 
thereby prejudiced." See also State v. Wilson, 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 
19 (1989). 
In summation, Appellant was initially charged with failing to 
have his vehicle registered according to the laws of Utah. He came 
to trial expecting to defend that charge. During trial, the 
prosecution did not change that charge but merely the ordinance 
they proceeded under. This change had no effect on Appellant's 
potential defense to the charge of which he was convicted. It is 
clear Appellant could have been prepared to defend against either 
ordinance since both proscribed the identical conduct. 
Further, Appellant is in no position to complain about the 
adequacy of the amended information on appeal because he failed to 
raise the issue in the trial court. In Pierce, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 38, the Utah Appellate Court stated that "if the Defendant fails 
to raise the inadequacy of the information before trial by written 
motion, that issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." 
See also State v. Fulton, 742 P. 2d 1208, 1215 (Utah 1987). 
Appellant acknowledges this deficiency in his Appellate Brief but 
suggests he can raise it now because his "substantial rights" were 
affected in trial. As shown above, none of Appellant's substantial 
rights were affected by the City's acts to amend the information. 
Appellant was NOT placed twice in jeopardy for the same 
offense. He was tried once and only once for failure to have his 
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vehicle properly registered. 
III. 
UTAH'S MOTOR VEHICLE ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL. THE TERM 
"RESIDENT" FOR PURPOSES OF THE ACT IS NOT VAGUE BUT 
RATHER CLEARLY DEFINED UNDER UTAH LAW. 
Appellant claims the Utah Motor Vehicle Act is 
unconstitutionally vague. Specifically Appellant suggests the term 
"nonresident", for purposes of required vehicle registration under 
the Motor Vehicle Act, is not "sufficiently clear and definite to 
informed persons of ordinary intelligence what their conduct must 
be to conform to its requirements." Appellant's argument must fail 
because "residence" is clearly defined under Utah law. Utah Admin 
R.87 3-22-1M provides "resident status for the purpose of vehicle 
and trailer registration pursuant to U.C.A. Section 41-1-19" is as 
follows: 
B. Any person qualifying as a resident, who 
operates a vehicle, or allows the operation of a vehicle, 
in this state, must register it immediately. For the 
purposes of vehicle, boat, boat trailer or outboard motor 
registration, the term "resident" means, but is not 
limited to, the following: 
1. every person who is a legal resident of 
this state; (the fact that a person leaves the 
state temporarily will not be sufficient to 
terminate residency.) 
2. any person engaging in intrastate 
business and operating a vehicle, boat, boat 
trailer or outboard motor, as part of the 
business with this state, or any person 
maintaining a vehicle, boat, boat trailer or 
outboard motor, with this state designated as 
the home state; 
3. any person, except a tourist temporarily 
within this state, or a student, covered under 
rule R873-22-4M, who owns, leases, or rents a 
residence or a place of business within this 
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state7 or occupies or permits to be occupied 
a Utah residence or place of business; 
4 • any person engaging in a trade, 
profession, or occupation or accepting gainful 
employment in this state; 
5. any person allowing a vehicle, boat, boat 
trailer or outboard motor, to be kept or used 
by a resident of this state; and 
6. any person declaring himself to be a 
resident of Utah to obtain privileges not 
ordinarily extended to nonresidents, such as 
going to school or placing children in school 
without paying nonresident tuition or fees, 
maintaining a Utah driver's license, etc. 
(Emphasis Added,) 
Under the Utah Motor Vehicle Act, residence is clearly defined 
and Appellant fits squarely within the definition. Appellant 
admitted that at all relevant times he "rented a residence" in Utah 
(B.3 above) was "gainfully employed" in Utah (B.4 above) and has 
"maintained a Utah driver's license" (B.6 above). Residency for 
purposes of the Motor Vehicle Act is "sufficiently clear and 
definite" to preserve the constitutionality of the Utah statute. 
IV. 
UTAH'S MOTOR VEHICLE SEAT BELT USAGE ACT DOES NOT DENY 
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. 
Appellant contends that the Utah Motor Vehicle Seat Belt Usage 
Act (Seat Belt Act or Act) U.C.A. Section 41-6-181 Et seq. violates 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States and similar provisions in the Utah Constitution. 
Appellant appears to argue the Act is unconstitutional (A) on its 
face and (B) in its enforcement. Respondent will address these two 
aspects of this point separately. 
A. 
THE SEAT BELT ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE. 
Appellant's argument rests primarily in the assertion that 
because a class of people are excluded from enforcement of the Act, 
Appellant was subjected to an "arbitrary and invidious 
discrimination." The class Appellant refers to is those people 
"engaged in pick-up, delivery, or service operations involving 
repeated starts and stops and requiring the front seat occupant to 
frequently and repeatedly enter and leave the vehicle." U.C.A. 
Section 41-6-183(5). Appellant does not claim any fundamental 
right involved or membership in a suspect class, therefore, the 
constitutionality of the Act must be measured by the traditional 
rational basis test. (Appellant admits the rational basis test 
applies in his appellant brief). 
Recently the Utah Supreme Court reiterated the principles of 
the rational basis test as set forth by the United States Supreme 
Court in Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1910). 
The Utah Court quoted from Lindsey as follows: 
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not take from the state, the 
power to classify in the adoption of police 
laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide 
scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids 
what is done only when it is without any 
reasonable basis, and therefore is purely 
arbitrary. 
2. The classification having some reasonable basis does 
not offend against that clause merely because 
it is not made with mathematical nicety, or 
because in practice it results in some 
inequality. 
3. When the classification of such a law is called in 
question if any state of facts reasonably can 
be convinced that would sustain it, the 
existence of that state of facts at the time 
the law was enacted must be assumed. 
4 • One who assails the classification in such a law, 
must carry the burden of showing that it does 
not rest on any reasonable basis, but is 
essentially arbitrary. 
(Emphasis added.) Utah Public Employees v. State, 610 P.2d 1272, 
1273-74 (1980). Appellant has the burden in this case to show the 
Act "does not rest on any reasonable basis". Appellant has failed 
to meet this initial burden. 
Appellant rests his claim on the legal conclusion that the 
Act subjects him to arbitrary and invidious discrimination and is 
not rational. The City is not required to respond until Appellant 
has adequately met his burden of showing the statute does not rest 
upon any reasonable basis but is essentially cirbitrary. However, 
it is submitted that the basis for excluding persons "involved in 
repeated starts and stops requiring the front seat occupant to 
frequently and repeatedly enter and leave the vehicle" is because 
of reasons obvious on the face at the Act. The Act excludes those 
persons whose use of a seat belt would by impractical. 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court indicated in Ellis v. Social 
Services Dept., 615 P.2d 1250, 1255-56 (1980) that "there is a 
general reluctance on the part of the judiciary to declare a 
legislative enactment facially unconstitutional. All doubts should 
be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute and no 
act should be declared unconstitutional unless it is clearly and 
palpably so." The court continues to say that "a statute must be 
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read to be consistent with basic constitutional rights, and will 
be upheld unless it contains a provision which expressly excludes 
a constitutional protection." See also 16 Am.Jur.2d, 
Constitutional Law Section 225 and cases cited therein. 
Both Appellant's burden, which he has not met and the 
presumption of constitutionality indicate the deficiency of 
Appellant's claim. The Act should be found to be constitutional 
on its face. 
B. 
APPELLANT DOES NOT RAISE A VALID CLAIM OF 
CONSTITUTIONALLY OBJECTIONABLE ENFORCEMENT OF THE SEAT 
BELT ACT. 
Appellant suggests the Act is unconstitutional in its 
application or enforcement. For such a claim Appellant is required 
to put forward evidence of "deliberate invidious discrimination." 
State v. Hodqdon, 571 P.2d 557, 560 (Or. App. 1977). Appellant's 
claim is based merely on hypotheticals. 
The City should not be required to respond to this type of 
empty claim without evidence to support actual discrimination. 
The Oregon Appellate Court stated the basis for such a claim in 
Hodqdon: "The key to a claim of constitutionally objectionable 
enforcement is evidence of deliberate invidious discrimination. 
The fact that a criminal statute leaves room for the exercise of 
discretion in its enforcement does not of itself give rise to a 
violation of equal protection." The court further observed that: 
"The United States Supreme Court in three recent cases reiterated 
the principle that a person challenging an official act as a 
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violation of the Equal Protection Clause must establish that the 
purpose, not the result, was invidiously discriminatory." Hodgdon, 
571 P.2d at 560. 
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 
L.Ed.2d 597 (1976); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Corp. , 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct.555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); and 
Massachusetts v. Feenev, 98 S.Ct. 252, 54 L.Ed.2d 169 (1977). 
In conclusion, Appellant has failed to articulate a legitimate 
constitutional claim against the Seat Belt Act, facially or through 
its enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's assertions in this appeal are nothing more than 
a mere shell of legitimate claims. Appellant lacks standing to 
raise a constitutional claim against L.M.C. Section 10.56.010. 
Appellant was not placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense in 
the court below, but rather the information charging him was 
properly amended by the Prosecution. The Utah Motor Vehicle Act 
is NOT unconstitutionally vague because the Utah Legislature has 
meticulously defined the term "residence." And finally, Appellant 
fails to raise legitimate constitutional claims against the motor 
vehicle Seat Belt Usage Act. Nevertheless, the Act is 
constitutional. 
Appellant was convicted by a jury of his peers for violating 
City ordinances. This court should affirm the same. 
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DATED this ^T^day of August, 1990. 
"t 
'VCyLtrJ7£<- —^ H 
W. Scott Barrett 
Attorney for Logan City 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, postage prepaid, to Appellant 
Pro Se David Craig Carlsen, P.O. Box 148, Logan, Utah 84321 this 
TSV^ day of August, 1990. .. , 
'lUJc^k'l^Ll^ 
W. SCOTT BARRETT 
LC90.2 
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